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Abstract
Major undertakings are necessary to translate international human rights from paper to reality.
The International Criminal Court is a momentous step towards ratifying the near-universal stan-
dards regarding basic human rights during wartime, but the Court—reactive as it is—will not alone
suffice. Proactive conflict prevention, through financial assistance and political pressure, is neces-
sary to truly protect civilians from the impact of war. Still, some people may remain in danger. In
these cases, the widespread negative impact of serious government human-rights violations, such
as genocide, militates against non-intervention.
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
AND STANDARDS
Jeremy Greenstock*
As we approach the new millennium, there is greater inter-
national consensus than ever before on the standards that
should govern behavior both in peace and in war. The founda-
tions were laid fifty years ago, in the aftermath of the horrors of
the Second World War. For the first time in history, nations
came together to set out, in the 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights,' the rights of all people everywhere. In the 1949
Geneva Conventions, they set down rules to protect non-combat-
ants from the devastating effects of armed conflict.
A substantial body of international human rights and hu-
manitarian law has been built on those foundations. Increas-
ingly, states have signed up to the key covenants and conventions
and embodied their principles in their domestic law. There is a
complex human rights machinery, including the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights that has focused world attention
on violations and put international pressure on states to improve
their protection of human rights.
We are still some way from universal ratification of the
human rights and humanitarian law instruments. But the work
of standard-setting through the great international instruments
has essentially been accomplished. The acid test now is practical
implementation: making the standards count at the grass roots
level.
What are the images that haunt us in 1999? Mass graves in
Kosovo; militias rampaging through East Timor; traumatized
and mutilated children in Sierra Leone; eerily unrecorded star-
vation and distress in Angola and The Horn. They starkly illus-
trate the huge gap that still exists between the international
norms and reality.
That gap is in part a reflection of the complex and chang-
ing nature of conflict in the modern world. Today's wars are
most frequently conflicts within, not between, states. In internal
* Ambassador to the United Nations from the United Kingdom.
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 67th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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conflicts, it is typically civilians who bear the brunt of suffering.
Increasingly, they are deliberately targeted by the combatants
and subjected to the most appalling human rights violations. In
the 1990s, civilians made up an estimated eighty percent of those
killed, hurt, and disabled in fighting.
In these often anarchic conflicts, many of the perpetrators
that attack civilians are not under the control of a state or part of
a chain of command. The fundamental and disturbing problem
is the collapse of the rule of law, both international and internal.
And some of the most intractable security crises are generated by
single-minded and brutal leaders who are only interested in
their own grip on power and do not give a damn about interna-
tional standards.
To what extent should we care? With the end of the Cold
War era, we take world peace, in the sense of no world war, for
granted. There is no longer the fear that every conflict that
flares up risks setting off a superpower conflagration. It is not so
easy to explain why our direct national interest is involved in dis-
tant conflicts. Disaster for us, and the majority of those with
whom we interact, is not imminent.
But deeper analysis shows that national interests are at
stake. Globalization is transforming the world, binding us more
closely together in trade, investment, travel, and communica-
tion. What happens in one country can have a direct impact on
the prosperity and security of countries on the other side of the
world.
The consequences of conflict affect us all: for example, in
Britain, ninety percent of the heroin on the streets of our major
cities is grown in Afghanistan, under the cover of the generation-
long conflict there. Across the countries of Europe, there are
now several hundred thousand citizens of the former Yugoslavia
who have fled to seek sanctuary from repeated conflicts there.
When governments commit crimes against their people, or
are unable to prevent some of their people committing atrocities
against others, stability and development are early casualties.
That has a knock-on effect on trade and investment, which par-
ticularly affects export-dependent countries such as Britain.
There is also a moral dimension. People in the United
States, Britain and elsewhere are increasingly unwilling to ignore
the suffering of people in other parts of the world. Few people
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would turn their backs if their neighbors were beating their chil-
dren. In the same way, few people aware of world events now
consider it none of their business when a government inflicts
atrocities on its own people. There is a strong sense that we can-
not turn our backs on massive violations of humanitarian and
human rights norms anywhere in the world if we maintain that
the values we espouse are universal.
So we must care. But that leads to a more difficult question:
if we care, how should we respond? What action can we take to
stop the ethnic cleansing, systematic rape and mass murder that
have been the tragic features of modern conflict?
First, we have to end impunity for the perpetrators. Sover-
eignty has in the past provided a cloak behind which states have
been able to protect individuals from being held accountable,
even when they have been guilty of the most appalling atrocities.
But with the establishment of the International Criminal Tribu-
nals for Rwanda 2 and the former Yugoslavia,3 the international
community has extended its writ to tackle the anomaly by which
prosecution is more likely for the killer of one person than for
the killer of thousands.
The Tribunals have succeeded in calling high-ranking indi-
viduals to account for their actions. The sentence by the
Rwanda Tribunal of Jean Kambanda to life in prison, after he
pleaded guilty to six counts of genocide and crimes against hu-
manity, marked the first time an individual, let alone a former
Head of Government, had been punished for the crime of geno-
cide.
But the Tribunals are limited geographically. We need a
system with global reach. The adoption last year of the
landmark Rome Statute ("Statute") 4 establishing a permanent
International Criminal Court ("Court")5 is now in prospect of
2. Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res 995, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994).
3. Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, S.C.
Res 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
4. UNITED NATIONS, DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF PLENIPOTENTARIES ON THE ESTAB-
LISHMENT OF AN INT'L CRIMINAL COURT, ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/9 (1998) (adopted by United Nations onJuly 17, 1998).
5. The International Criminal Court is an international court established to prose-
cute crimes such as genocide. United Nations Conference of Plenipotentaries on the Establish-
ment of an Int'l Criminal Court, (visited Dec. 4, 1999) <http://www.un.org/icc> (on file
with the Fordham International Law Journal).
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this goal. As U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has said, the
Statute represents "a giant step towards universalizing the fight
against impunity to include every country, every leader and every
militia guilty of crimes against our common humanity."
The Court gives expression to the determination of the in-
ternational community that genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes should not go unchecked. In effect, we have put
war criminals on notice that they will be answerable for their
crimes. If that makes only some future dictators think twice
before launching atrocities, then that in itself is worthwhile.
The Court will also empower victims with the knowledge
that, however powerful their oppressors are, justice is possible.
That will have an important part to play in reconciliation and in
helping victims and their families come to terms with the horror
of their suffering.
The Court's impact will depend on the breadth of interna-
tional support it can command. Eighty-nine states have already
signed the Statute. Many are enacting the legislation they re-
quire for ratification. The United Kingdom shares the wide-
spread wish that the United States should sign the Statute. A
Court with U.S. backing will be much stronger than one without
it. We recognize the concern that U.S. servicemen operating
overseas could be subject to unjustified, politically motivated ac-
cusations. But we, and other North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO") allies, do not believe this will be the case. There are
sufficient safeguards in the Statute to protect servicemen.
The most important such safeguard is the complementarity
principle, which allows domestic jurisdictions the right to try
their own nationals. If there were serious allegations made
about British citizens in good faith, then we are confident we
could demonstrate that there is a remedy in British justice. The
same would apply in the United States. We have encouraged our
U.S. colleagues to support the Court. We hope that a way can be
found to meet U.S. concerns while preserving the integrity of
the Statute.
But while the Court will exist as a warning, that in itself will
not be sufficient. If we are really to protect civilians from the
impact of war, then we need far-reaching strategies for prevent-
ing violent conflict from starting in the first place.
Those strategies must address the underlying causes of con-
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flict. Modern conflicts are rarely ideological: their roots go
deeper. There are a range of factors that make the descent into
violence more likely. As the treatment of the ethnic Albanian
community in Kosovo has shown, where a particular group is dis-
criminated against over a long period, denied a political voice or
mistreated, conflict may follow. Poverty, too, increases the risks
of violent conflict, especially where some sections of society are
marginalized and denied access to even basic services. Undis-
ciplined, unaccountable security forces are more likely to be vio-
lent and abusive. Easy access to weapons obviously makes vio-
lence more likely.
We need to tackle each of these strands: strengthening our
support for equitable development and good governance; help-
ing vulnerable states develop responsible and well-trained secur-
ity forces; curbing illicit trafficking in weapons, including small
arms that have become the main cause of civilian deaths in mod-
ern welfare.
None of this is easy, quick or cheap. But given the enor-
mous human and financial costs of conflict, it must be at-
tempted. We need to recognize the vital importance of conflict
prevention and post-conflict peace-building in breaking the cy-
cle of violence, and to invest more heavily in it.
But even if we take prevention more seriously, it will not
always succeed. As the U.N. Secretary General's 1999 Report on
the work of the United Nations states: "[p] reventive philosophy
is predicated on the assumption of good faith, the belief that
Governments will seek to place the welfare of their people as a
whole over narrow sectional interests. Sadly, we know that this is
often not the case."6
If, despite all the assistance and political pressure the inter-
national community can bring to bear, large numbers of people
remain in danger of being killed, maimed or driven from their
homes, then should we give up and stand aside? Or should we
be ready in the last resort to engage militarily to impose interna-
tional standards and values?
Non-intervention is an important principle of international
order, acting as a deterrent against the imposition of a political
system or political values on countries that may not want them.
6. Report of the Secretaiy-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. GAOR 54th Sess.,
Supp. No. 1, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/54/1 (1999).
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But acts of genocide cannot be an internal matter. As the British
Foreign Secretary told the U.N. General Assembly in September
1999: "the first responsibility for reconciling internal conflict
rests with the state in which that conflict arises. But we have a
shared responsibility to act when confronted with genocide, the
mass displacement of peoples or major breaches of international
humanitarian law."
This year, the events in Kosovo and more recently East Ti-
mor have led to a great deal of soul-searching around the world
on the case for humanitarian intervention and its relations to
the principles of national sovereignty.
I sense a general trend of international support for greater
activism by the United Nations when humanitarian catastrophes
threaten. But there is an important debate to be had on the
circumstances in which military action is the right course, and
the conditions under which such action should be taken.
I believe that that debate, which is crucial to the Security
Council's role in the maintenance of international peace and
security, needs to be pursued as a matter of urgency. If we can
build consensus-in the Security Council and more widely-
around a pragmatic set of principles and conditions, then it is
more likely that the Security Council will be able to unite, and
unite quickly, in responding to the challenges it faces.
The bones of a new international approach to gross viola-
tions of human rights and international humanitarian law are
beginning to emerge: the establishment of a strong and effec-
tive International Criminal Court acting as a deterrent and
bringing those who perpetrate atrocities to justice; a shift from a
culture of reaction to one of prevention; the building of a satis-
factory international consensus on intervention across borders
in humanitarian emergencies. All of these goals are major tasks.
But they are all crucial if the new millennium is to see interna-
tional human rights and humanitarian law translated from paper
to reality. We must roll up our sleeves and get down to it now.
